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Abstract
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-
proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity dened on the domain, is a
random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random
dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random
dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not ran-
dom dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition
(introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dicta-
torship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is a
ramication result that shows that under certain assumptions, a domain that is a ran-
dom dictatorship domain for two voters is also a random dictatorship domain for an
arbitrary number of voters.
1 Introduction
It has long been understood that allowing for randomization signicantly enlarges the
set of incentive-compatible social choice functions. The reason for this is clear. Out-
comes in a random social choice functions are lotteries and it is typically assumed
that player preferences over lotteries satisfy domain restrictions. If they satisfy the
von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis, then convex combinations of
deterministic incentive-compatible social choice functions are also incentive-compatible
in the random environment. The converse question is more interesting and much
harder: for what preference domains is it the case that every incentive-compatible
randomized social choice function is a convex combination of incentive-compatible de-
terministic social choice functions? We address a specic version of this question in
voting environments.
A voting environment is one where monetary compensation for players is not fea-
sible. According to the classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard (1973), Sat-
terthwaite (1975)) in this environment, the only dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
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1(or strategy-proof) social choice functions that satisfy the mild requirement of unanim-
ity are dictatorial, provided that voters' preferences belong to the universal domain.1
In a subsequent paper, Gibbard (1977) characterized the class of strategy-proof ran-
dom social choice functions over the universal domain. An immediate consequence
of this powerful result is that strategy-proof random social choice functions that sat-
isfy unanimity are random dictatorships. A random dictatorship is a xed probability
distribution over dictatorial social choice functions. In other words, if social choice
functions are assumed to satisfy unanimity, then the universal domain has the prop-
erty that we alluded to in the earlier paragraph: every strategy-proof random social
choice function is a convex combination of deterministic strategy-proof social choice
functions. Related results have been proved for the domain of two alternatives (see
Picot and Sen (2011)) and in some auctions settings (see Mehta and Vazirani (2004),
Manelli and Vincent (2007)).2
In our terminology, the universal domain is both a dictatorial domain as well as a
random dictatorship domain. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between
these kinds of domains. Does the property of the universal domain generalize? i.e.,
is every dictatorial domain a random dictatorship domain? We show this is false by
means of an example with seven alternatives and twenty-two preference orderings. We
also identify general conditions under which dictatorial domains are not random dic-
tatorship domains. We also specify two sets of conditions that ensure that a domain is
a random dictatorship domain. These conditions are signicantly stronger than those
that force a domain to be dictatorial. The strength of these conditions suggest that
randomization permits a much richer class of strategy-proof random social choice func-
tions than the convex hull of deterministic strategy-proof social choice functions. We
note here that this occurs despite the fact that the notion of random strategy-proofness
that we use (following Gibbard (1977)) is very strong. In particular, it requires the ex-
pected utility from the truth-telling lottery to be greater than the expected utility from
misrepresentation for every utility representation of true preferences. Equivalently, the
lottery from truth-telling must rst-order stochastically dominate every lottery arising
from a misrepresentation.
Our results rely heavily on the approach in Aswal et al. (2003). They introduced
the notion of a linked domain and showed that every linked domain is dictatorial. We
construct an example of a linked domain that admits a non-dictatorial strategy-proof
random social choice function that satises unanimity. We then show that random
dictatorship is restored when the connectivity graph induced by a linked domain, is
strengthened suitably. In particular, we assume the existence of a hub alternative that
is connected with every other alternative. We also provide an alternative sucient
condition in a dierent way. We strengthen the connectedness requirement underlying
the denition of a linked domain to obtain the notion of a strongly linked domain; we
then impose an additional condition that is however weaker than the counterpart of
1There is also an additional requirement that the number of alternatives is at least three .
2Auction settings refer to models where monetary compensation is permissible and player utility functions
are quasi-linear.
2the hub condition.
The proofs of our suciency result rely on a ramication result that states that a
random dictatorship domain when there are two voters is in fact, a random dictatorship
domain when there is an arbitrary number of voters. This approach was initiated in
Kalai and Muller (1977) in the context of domains that permit non-dictatorial Arrovian
aggregation. Corresponding results for dictatorial domains appear in Kim and Roush
(1989), Sen (2001) and Aswal et al. (2003). The result for random dictatorship is
however, signicantly more dicult than its dictatorial domains counterpart. In fact,
we are able to prove it only under an additional hypothesis which is fortunately weak
and satised by the suciency conditions. We believe that this result is of independent
interest.
We now proceed to details.
2 Preliminaries
The model in the paper is completely standard (see Gibbard (1973), Aswal et al. (2003))
- we therefore introduce the required notation and denitions without comment.
We let A = fa1;a2;:::;amg be a nite set of alternatives where jAj = m and
m  3. The set I = f1;2;:::;Ng is the set of voters with jIj = N and N  2.
Each voter i has a (preference) ordering Pi 2 D over the elements of A. The set D is
referred to as the preference domain. It is assumed that D  P where P is the set of all
antisymmetric orderings over the elements of A. For any a;b 2 A, aPib is interpreted
as \a is strictly preferred to b according to Pi." We let rk(Pi) denote the kth ranked
alternative in Pi, k = 1;:::;m, i.e., [rk(Pi) = a] ) [jfb 2 A : bPiagj = k   1]. Let the
map b : A ! f1;2;:::;mg denote a function such that b(ak) = k, k = 1;2;:::;m, and
let ek 2 Rm denote a unit row vector, where the kth element is 1 and the remaining
elements are zeros.
A preference prole P 2 DN is an N-tuple (P1;:::;PN). Finally, let L(A) denote
the set of lotteries over the elements of the set A.
Denition 1 A Random Social Choice Function (RSCF) is a map ' : DN ! L(A).
For every prole P, '(P)  ['a1(P) 'a2(P) ::: 'am(P)] is a probability vector.
We follow the notion of incentive-compatibility introduced in Gibbard (1977). A
RSCF is strategy-proof if no voter can obtain a strictly higher expected utility by
misreporting her preferences for any utility representation of her true preference and
any beliefs regarding the reports of other voters.
Denition 2 A utility function u : A ! R represents the ordering Pi over A, if for
all a;b 2 A, [aPi b] , [u(a) > u(b)].
Let U(Pi) denote the set of utility functions that represent Pi, while Ui(P) =
P
x2A u(x)'x(P) given any u 2 U(Pi), denotes the von-Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility function of voter i under the prole P.
3Denition 3 A RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is strategy-proof, if for all i 2 I; Pi;P0
i 2 D,
P i 2 DN 1 and u 2 U(Pi), we have Ui(Pi;P i)  Ui(P0
i;P i).
The notion of strategy-proofness can be equivalently formulated in terms of stochas-
tic dominance.
Denition 4 A RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is strategy-proof, if for all i 2 I; Pi;P0
i 2 D
and P i 2 DN 1, we have
Pt
k=1 'rk(Pi)(Pi;P i) 
Pt
k=1 'rk(Pi)(P0
i;P i) for all t =
1;2;:::;m.
If there exists a prole P, a voter i, a preference P0
i and t 2 f1;:::;m   1g such
that
Pt
k=1 'rk(Pi)(Pi;P i) <
Pt
k=1 'rk(Pi)(P0
i;P i), we shall say that i manipulates '
at P via P0
i.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that RSCF's under consideration satisfy
unanimity. This property requires an alternative to be selected with certainty if it is
ranked rst by all voters.
Denition 5 A RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) satises unanimity if for all P 2 DN and
aj 2 A, [aj = r1(Pi) for all i 2 I] ) ['aj(P) = 1].
A RSCF of particular importance is random dictatorship.
Denition 6 The RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is a random dictatorship if there exists
i 2 [0;1], i 2 I with
PN
i=1 i = 1 such that for all P 2 DN, '(P) =
PN
i=1 i eb(r1(Pi)).
The focus of our paper are random dictatorship domains which have the property
that every strategy-proof and unanimous RSCF dened on them, is a random dicta-
torship.
Denition 7 A domain D is a random dictatorship domain, if every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is a random dictatorship.
A fundamental result in random mechanism design theory proved in Gibbard (1977)
is that the domain P is a a random dictatorship domain (see also Duggan (1996), Sen
(2011)).
Theorem 1 The domain P is a random dictatorship domain.
The notions of a RSCF, strategy-proofness and random dictatorship have famil-
iar deterministic counterparts. Thus a deterministic RSCF or simply a social choice
function (SCF) is a RSCF whose output at every prole is a degenerate probability
distribution. Similarly, dictatorship is a special case of random dictatorship where
exactly one of the coecients i in Denition 6 is one and all others are zero. A
dictatorial domain is similarly a domain where every strategy-proof and unanimous
social choice function is dictatorial. According to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
(Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)), the domain P is a dictatorial domain.
4A central concern of this paper is the relationship between dictatorial and random
dictatorship domains. It is easily veried that a random dictatorship domain is dicta-
torial. The question of interest is clearly the converse question. As we have remarked,
the universal domain is both a dictatorial and a random dictatorship domain. Does
this relationship hold true generally? In order to investigate this question, we recall
the main result of Aswal et al. (2003) on dictatorial domains.
Some additional notation will be helpful here. For every non-empty B  A, we
let DB = fPi 2 D : r1(Pi) 2 Bg. For a mutually disjoint non-empty pair B;C  A,
DB;C = fPi 2 D : r1(Pi) 2 B and r2(Pi) 2 Cg. If B and C are singletons with
B = fbg and C = fcg, we write DB as Db and DB;C as Db;c.
Denition 8 Let D be a domain. A pair of alternatives a;b is connected (denoted by
a  b) if Da;b 6= ; and Db;a 6= ;.
A domain induces a connectivity graph as follows: the set of nodes of the graph is
the set of alternatives and two nodes a and b have an edge connecting them i a  b.
Denition 9 Let D be a domain. Let B  A and a = 2 B. Then, a is linked to B if
there exist b;c 2 B such that a  b and a  c.
Denition 10 The domain D is linked, if there exists an one to one function  :
f1;:::;mg ! f1;:::;mg such that
(i) a(1)  a(2).
(ii) a(j) is linked to fa(1);:::a(j 1)g, j = 3;:::;m.
The notion of a linked domain is formulated entirely in terms of alternatives that
can be ranked rst and second according to preferences in the domain. A domain is
linked if its associated connectivity graph is rich enough. The reader is referred to
Aswal et al. (2003) for details and numerous examples. The following result is their
main result.
Theorem 2 A linked domain is dictatorial.
A natural question is whether a linked domain is a random dictatorship domain.
This is addressed in the next section.
3 Examples
3.1 A Specic Case
In this section, we provide an example of a dictatorial domain that is not a random
dictatorship domain.
Let A = fa1;a2;a3;a4;a5;a6;a7g. The domain DL of preferences over these seven
alternatives is described in Appendix A. The following features of the domain are
critical and can be readily veried.
51. Domain DL is linked. Its connectivity graph is shown in Figure 1. Note that
jDLj = 22. Since Aswal et al. (2003) have demonstrated that the minimal car-
dinality of a linked domain is 4m   6, domain DL is in fact a linked domain of
minimal size.
2. [Pk 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L ] ) [a2 = rm(Pk)]. Whenever a1 and a3 are ranked rst and
second or vice-versa, a2 is ranked last.
3. [Pk = 2 D
a1;a3
L [D
a3;a1
L ] ) [a2 2 fr1(Pk);r2(Pk);r3(Pk)g]. If Condition 2 above does
not apply, a2 is ranked either rst, second or third.
q q q q
q q q
a3 a4 a7 a2
a1 a5 a6
Figure 1: Connectivity Graph of Domain DL
According to Theorem 2, DL is a dictatorial domain. However, as Proposition 1
below shows, it is not a random dictatorship domain.
Proposition 1 The domain DL is not a random dictatorship domain.
Proof: It suces to construct a unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial RSCF
' : D2
L ! L(A).3 Let I = fi;jg and consider the RSCF ' below:
'(Pi;Pj) =
(
"eb(r1(Pi)) + eb(r2(Pj)) + (1   "   )e2 if Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L and Pj 2 D
a2
L
"eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)) otherwise.
where 0 < " < 1 and 0 <   min(";1   ").
Thus, ' is a random dictatorship with weights " and 1 " on the best alternatives of
voters i and j at all proles except when i's rst and second ranked alternatives are a1
and a3 or vice-versa and j's best alternative is a2. In this case, probability weight  is
transferred from a2 to j's second ranked alternative. It is evident that ' is unanimous
and not a random dictatorship. We only need to check that ' is strategy-proof. In
order to do this, it suces to consider only the seven cases below.
Case 1: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pj 2 D
a2
L and Pi = 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L . Voter i considers
a manipulation via P0
i 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L .
Let u 2 U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) =
"u(r1(Pi))+ u(a2) "u(r1(P0
i)) u(r2(Pj)). If a2 Pi r2(Pj), then Ui(Pi;Pj) 
Ui(P0
i;Pj)  0. Suppose r2(Pj)Pi a2. Note that r2(Pj) 2 fa6;a7g (refer to P4
and P5 in Appendix A). Whenever a6Pia2 or a7Pia2, we have a2Pia1 and a2Pia3,
i.e., a2Pir1(P0
i). Hence, Ui(Pi;Pj) Ui(P0
i;Pj) = 
h
u(r1(Pi)) u(r2(Pj))
i
+(" 
)
h
u(r1(Pi))   u(r1(P0
i))
i
+ 
h
u(a2)   u(r1(P0
i))
i
 0.
3In case there are more than two voters, the additional voters can be made dummies whose preferences
have no bearing on the outcome.
6Case 2: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pj 2 D
a2
L and Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L . Voter i considers
a manipulation via P0
i = 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L .
Let u 2 U(Pi). Since Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L [D
a3;a1
L , r2(Pj)Pia2. Hence the loss from misrep-
resentation is Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) = "
h
u(r1(Pi))   u(r1(P0
i))
i
+ 
h
u(r2(Pj))  
u(a2)
i
 0
Case 3: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pj 2 D
a2
L and Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L . Voter i considers a
manipulation via P0
i where P0
i 2 D
a3;a1
L .
Let u 2 U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) =
"
h
u(a1)   u(a3)
i
 0.
Case 4: The prole is (Pi;Pj), where Pj 2 D
a2
L and Pi 2 D
a3;a1
L . Voter i considers a
manipulation via P0
i where P0
i 2 D
a1;a3
L .
Let u 2 U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) =
"
h
u(a3)   u(a1)
i
 0.
Case 5: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L [ D
a3;a1
L and Pj = 2 D
a2
L . Voter j considers
a manipulation via P0
j where P0
j 2 D
a2
L .
Let u 2 U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi;Pj)   Uj(Pi;P0
j) =
(1   "   )
h
u(r1(Pj))   u(a2)
i
+ 
h
u(r1(Pj))   u(r2(P0
j))
i
 0.
Case 6: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L [ Da3;a1 and Pj 2 D
a2
L . Voter j considers
a manipulation via P0
j where P0
j = 2 D
a2
L .
Let u 2 U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi;Pj)   Uj(Pi;P0
j) =
(1   "   )
h
u(a2)   u(r1(P0
j))
i
+ 
h
u(r2(Pj))   u(r1(P0
j))
i
 0.
Case 7: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pi 2 D
a1;a3
L [ Da3;a1 and Pj 2 D
a2
L . Voter j considers
a manipulation via P0
j where P0
j 2 D
a2
L and P0
j 6= Pj.
Let u 2 U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi;Pj)   Uj(Pi;P0
j) =

h
u(r2(Pj))   u(r2(P0
j))
i
 0.
We conclude that ' is strategy-proof.
3.2 A General Case
The example we provided in Section 3.1 is not the simplest case of a linked domain
that admits strategy-proof, unanimous and non-dictatorial RSCF's, since our objective
was to use one example to cover the two domains that follow in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Here, we provide simpler but more general restrictions that generate linked domains
that are not randomly dictatorial. We do not restrict the cardinality of either the set
of alternatives or the domains.
Given a 2 A, let S(a) = fx 2 A : there exists Pk 2 Da; such that x = r2(Pk)g. It
is evident that a = 2 S(a). We consider a minimally rich domain DNRD dened below.
7Denition 11 A minimally rich domain satises the Condition NRD, denoted DNRD,
if there exist x;y 2 A such that
(i) y = 2 S(x), x = 2 S(y) and S(x) \ S(y) = ;.
(ii) For all Pk 2 Dx
NRD and z 2 S(y), zPky.
(iii) For all Pk 2 D
Anfx;yg
NRD , [there exists z 2 S(y) such that zPky ] ) [yPkx].
Remark 1 The domain DNRD must have at least 4 alternatives.
Proposition 2 The domain DNRD is not a random dictatorship domain.
The proof of the Proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and is relegated
to Appendix B.
Next, we investigate the compatibility of the restrictions needed in Condition NRD
with linked domains. We rst restate the denition of linked domains in terms of a
graph. Let G be a graph, the set of whose nodes is A. A path in G is a sequence
fa
(k)gT
k=1 such that every pair (a
(k 1);a
(k)), k = 1;:::;T, is an edge. Graph G is
connected if for all aj;ak 2 A, there exists a path connecting aj and ak.
Denition 12 The connected graph G is linked, if there exists an one to one function
 : f1;:::;mg ! f1;:::;mg such that
(i) (a(1);a(2)) is an edge.
(ii) For all j = 3;:::;m, there exist a;b 2 fa(1);:::;a(j 1)g such that (a;a(j)) and
(b;a(j)) are both edges.
Fix a domain D. Let G(D) denote the connectivity graph of domain D. A domain
D is linked i G(D) is linked. The following proposition provides conditions on a linked
graph G such that there exists a linked domain DL with G(DL) = G and furthermore
DL satises the Condition NRD.
Proposition 3 Given a linked graph G, if there exist x;y 2 A such that
(i) (x;y) is not an edge,
(ii) for all z 2 A where (x;z) is an edge, (y;z) is not an edge; and for all z0 2 A
where (y;z0) is an edge, (x;z0) is not an edge,
then there exists a linked domain DL with G(DL) = G such that DL satises the Con-
dition NRD.
Proof: We construct DL by following three steps:
Step 1: For all a;b 2 A, if (a;b) is an edge, generate two preference orderings Pk;P0
k
such that (i) r1(Pk) = a = r2(P0
k), (ii) r2(Pk) = b = r1(P0
k) and (iii) all relative
rankings among Anfa;bg in both Pk and P0
k are unrestricted.
8Step 2: For all incomplete preference ordering Pk generated in Step 1, such that r1(Pk) =
x, let y = rm(Pk). Next, let the relative rankings between r2(Pk) and rm(Pk) be
arbitrary.
Step 3: For all incomplete preference ordering Pk generated in Step 1, such that r1(Pk) 2
Anfxg, if y 2 fr1(Pk);r2(Pk)g, let the relative rankings beyond r2(Pk) be arbi-
trary; if y = 2 fr1(Pk);r2(Pk)g, let y = r3(Pk) and let the relative rankings beyond
r3(Pk) be arbitrary .
Step 1 species every preference ordering's top two alternatives which indicates that
for all a;b 2 A, if (a;b) is an edge, then a  b in domain DL; and if (a;b) is not an
edge, then D
a;b
L = ; and D
b;a
L = ;. Hence, by Denition 12, domain DL is linked. It is
evident that the restrictions on graph G imply that DL satises the rst restriction of
the Condition NRD. Next, since (x;y) is not an edge, Step 2 does not contradict Step
1. Since y is ranked last in every preference ordering Pk with r1(Pk) = x, domain DL
meets the second restriction of the Condition NRD.
It is evident that Step 3 does not contradict Steps 1 and 2. We next check whether
domain DL satises the third restriction of the Condition NRD. According to Step 1, we
know that for all a 2 A, whenever (a;y) is not an edge, D
y;a
L = ; and hence a = 2 S(y).
Thus, to show that the third restriction of the Condition NRD is not violated by
domain DL, it suces to show that for every preference ordering Pk 2 D
Anfx;yg
L with
xPky, there exists no alternative a 2 A such that (a;y) is an edge and aPky. Since
r1(Pk) 6= x and y 2 fr1(Pk);r2(Pk);r3(Pk)g by Step 3, xPky implies that x = r2(Pk).
Then, according to Step 1, we know that (r1(Pk);x) is an edge. Furthermore, by the
second restriction on G, (r1(Pk);y) is never an edge. In conclusion, domain DL satises
the third restriction of the Condition NRD.
Remark 2 To construct a linked domain satisfying the Condition NRD, we need at
least 6 alternatives.4 Furthermore, linked domains satisfying the Condition NRD need
not be the minimal size linked domains.
In the remainder of the paper, we will provide sucient conditions for a domain to
be a random dictatorship domain.
4 Ramication from two to an arbitrary num-
ber of voters
Our rst step is to show that a random dictatorship domain when there are exactly
two voters, is also a random dictatorship domain when there are more than two voters,
provided an additional condition is satised. A result of this kind was rst established in
Kalai and Muller (1977) which showed that a domain where all Arrovian social welfare
functions are dictatorial when there are two voters also admits only dictatorial Arrovian
4It is possible to construct a linked domain with 5 alternatives which satises the connectivity graph
Figure 2 (e) and is not a random dictatorship domain.
9social welfare functions when there are more than two voters. A similar property has
been shown for deterministic strategy-proof SCFs (Kim and Roush (1989), see also Sen
(2001), Aswal et al. (2003), Chatterji and Sen (2011)). In particular, a domain where
all strategy-proof SCFs satisfying unanimity are dictatorial when there are two voters,
is also a domain where all strategy-proof SCFs satisfying unanimity are dictatorial for
an arbitrary number of voters. A property of this kind is, of course, interesting in its
own right. In addition, it is very helpful analytically; in order to determine whether
a domain is dictatorial, it suces to verify that every two-voter strategy-proof SCF
satisfying unanimity dened on it is dictatorial.
In this section we provide a result relating the two-voter with the many-voter case
for RSCF's. Unfortunately, this appears to be a signicantly more dicult question to
resolve than the corresponding one in the deterministic case. We are able to prove it
only by making an additional assumption.
Denition 13 The domain D satises the triple-property if there exist a;b;c 2 A such
that a  b, b  c and c  a.
A domain satises the triple property if its connectivity graph has a triangle sub-
graph. We also need an assumption that is very mild and is standard in the literature.
Denition 14 The domain D is minimally rich if Da 6= ; for all a 2 A.
A minimally rich domain has the property that every alternative is ranked rst by
some preference ordering in the domain. This assumption excludes some trivial cases
from consideration.
Theorem 3 Let D be a minimally rich domain, satisfying the triple property. The
following two statements are equivalent:
(a) ' : D2 ! L(A) is unanimous and strategy-proof ) ' is a random dictatorship.
(b) ' : DN ! L(A), N  2, is unanimous and strategy-proof ) ' is a random
dictatorship.
The proof of the result is in Appendix C.
Remark 3 In Appendix C, we prove a stronger version of Theorem 3 by using a weaker
version of the triple condition. The triple condition is a fairly weak condition satised
by all linked domains. We can therefore use Theorem 3 to prove our random dicta-
torship results. The circular domain (Sato (2010)) is a dictatorial domain that does
not satisfy the triple condition; however, it satises the weaker condition in Appendix
C that we use to prove the result. A positive feature of our additional assumption
therefore is that the triple condition or its weaker counterpart are often required to
prove dictatorship or random dictatorship even in the two voter case. Domains that
violate the weaker assumption such as the single-peaked domain (see Demange (1982),
Danilov (1994)) are not dictatorial for any number of voters.
105 Random Dictatorship Results
In this section we provide two conditions that ensure that a domain is a random dicta-
torship domain. The rst imposes a great degree of connectivity in the linked domain
connectivity graph. The second strengthens the requirement for the connectedness of
two alternatives but imposes a weaker requirement on the connectivity graph.
5.1 Linked Domains with Condition H
We impose the following condition on the connectedness structure of domains.
Denition 15 A domain D satises Condition H if there exists a 2 A such that b  a,
for all b 2 Anfag.
The alternative a that is connected to all other alternatives will be referred to as
a hub. It is clear that both domain DL (Figure 1 and Appendix A) in Section 3.1
and domain DNRD in Section 3.2 violate Condition H. We provide examples of six
connectivity graphs below to illustrate the relation between Condition H and linked
domains.
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Figure 2: Connectivity Graphs
In diagram (a), the domain is not linked but satises Condition H. The domains
whose connectivity graphs are shown in diagrams (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), are linked.
The domains corresponding to (b), (c) and (d) satisfy Condition H, while domains
related to (e) and (f) violate it. In diagram (b), any alternative can be a hub; in
diagram (c) it must be either a1 or a2, while in diagram (d) the only candidate for
the hub is a2. Observe that in diagrams (e) and (f) for any two alternatives, they are
either connected or connected to a common alternative.
Our main result in this subsection is that the assumption of a linked domain in con-
junction with Condition H ensures that the domain is a random dictatorship domain.
11Theorem 4 A linked domain satisfying Condition H is a random dictatorship domain.
Proof: Let D be a linked domain satisfying Condition H. In particular, let ak be a
hub. Since a linked domain satises the triple property, Theorem 3 applies. In order
to prove the theorem, it suces therefore to show that every strategy-proof RSCF
' : D2 ! L(A) satisfying unanimity, is a random dictatorship. Assume without loss of
generality that I = fi;jg.
Lemma 1 There exists a function  : f1;2;:::;mg ! f1;2;:::;mg for domain D as
specied in Denition 10 with ak = a(1).
Proof: Suppose not, i.e., for every function ^  satisfying Denition 10, we have ak 6=
a^ (1). Suppose there exists  satisfying Denition 10 with ak 2 fa(2);a(3)g. Assume
without loss of generality that ak = a(2). Now permute elements in A such that
a(2) is re-labeled a(1), while a(1) is re-labeled as a(2), while keeping all other labels
intact. This creates another function 0 satisfying Denition 10 but ak = a0(1). This
contradicts our earlier assumption.
Now, suppose ^  satisfying Denition 10 is such that ak = a^ (k) with k > 3. Dene
a new function: (1) = ^ (k), (s) = ^ (s   1), for all 2  s  k and (t) = ^ (t)
for all k + 1  t  m. According to Condition H, a(2) = a^ (1)  a^ (k) = a(1) and
a(3) = a^ (2)  a^ (k) = a(1). Meanwhile, by ^ , a(3) = a^ (2)  a^ (1) = a(2). Thus we
have a(1);a(2);a(3) form a triple of connectedness. Next, according to ^ , we know
that for all 3  j  k   1, a^ (j) is linked to fa^ (1);:::;a^ (j 1)g. Meanwhile, since
a^ (j) = a(j+1) and fa^ (1);:::;a^ (j 1)g = fa(2);:::;a(j)g  fa(1);a(2);:::;a(j)g,
we know that a(j+1) is linked to fa(1);a(2);:::;a(j)g. Similarly, for all k  j 
m, a^ (j+1) = a(j+1), a^ (j+1) is linked to fa^ (1);:::;a^ (j)g and fa^ (1);:::;a^ (j)g =
fa^ (1);:::;a^ (k 1);a^ (k);a^ (k+1);:::;a^ (j)g = fa(2);:::;a(k);a(1);a(k+1);:::;a(j)g =
fa(1);:::;a(j)g. Therefore, a(j+1) is linked to fa(1);:::;a(j)g. Hence  satises
Denition 10, contradicting our initial assumption once again.
Assume for simplicity that the function in Denition 10 is the identity function.
It follows from Lemma 1 that the hub is a1. Dene Sl = fa1;:::;alg, l = 3;:::;m.
Clearly, a1 2 Sl for all l. Our proof consists in establishing two steps.
Step 1. There exists " 2 [0;1] such that for all Pi;Pj 2 DS3, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) +
(1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Step 2. If for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl 1, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)), then
for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
The following lemma establishes Step 1.
Lemma 2 There exists " 2 [0;1] such that for all Pi;Pj 2 DS3, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi))+
(1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Proof: Since a1;a2;a3 form a triple of connectedness, the lemma follows from Theorem
2 in Sen (2011).
12To verify Step 2, we use the following induction hypothesis: for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl 1,
l > 3, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)). We will show that for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl,
'(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)). Since D is linked and a1 is a hub, we know
that there exists ak 2 Sl 1 such that al  ak, ak  a1 and al  a1, forming a triple of
connectedness. The next 3 lemmas explain the verication of Step 2.
Lemma 3 For all Pi;Pj 2 Dfa1;ak;alg, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Proof: Since al;ak;a1 form a triple of connectedness, applying Theorem 2 in Sen (2011),
we infer that there exists  2 [0;1] such that '(Pi;Pj) =  eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   )eb(r1(Pj))
for all Pi;Pj 2 Dfa1;ak;alg.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) +(1 ")eb(r1(Pj))
for all Pi;Pj 2 Dfa1;akg. Therefore, " = .
For the next lemma, pick any aj 2 Sl 1nfa1;akg. Since al  a1 and aj  a1 (by
Condition H), we have P
i 2 Dal;a1 and P
j 2 Daj;a1.
Lemma 4 'al(P
i ;P
j ) = " and 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) = 1   ".
Proof: We consider two cases.
Firstly, suppose that 'al(P
i ;P
j ) =  and 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) = 1   . Since there exists
P0
i 2 Da1;al (recall a1  al), strategy-proofness and the induction hypothesis imply
that  = 'al(P
i ;P
j ) = 'al(P
i ;P
j ) + 'a1(P
i ;P
j ) = 'al(P0
i;P
j ) + 'a1(P0
i;P
j ) =
'a1(P0
i;P
j ) = ".
Second, suppose that 'al(P
i ;P
j ) + 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) < 1. Since there exist P0
i 2 Da1;al
and P0
j 2 Da1;aj (by Condition H), strategy-proofness, the induction hypothesis and
Lemma 3 imply that 'al(P
i ;P
j ) + 'a1(P
i ;P
j ) = 'al(P0
i;P
j ) + 'a1(P0
i;P
j ) = " and
'aj(P
i ;P
j )+'a1(P
i ;P
j ) = 'aj(P
i ;P0
j)+'a1(P
i ;P0
j) = 1 ". Therefore, it must be the
case that 'a1(P
i ;P
j ) > 0. Assume that 'a1(P
i ;P
j ) =  > 0. Then, 'al(P
i ;P
j ) =
"   , 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) = 1   "    and
P
at= 2fa1;aj;alg 'at(P
i ;P
j ) = . This implies that
there exists ai 2 Anfa1;aj;alg such that 'ai(P
i ;P
j ) > 0.
By Condition H, there exists Pk 2 Da1;ai. Let s;s0 be such that al = rs(Pk) and
aj = rs0(Pk). We need to consider two cases.
Case 1: s < s0.
Let  Pi = Pk. By the induction hypothesis, '(  Pi;P
j ) = "e1 + (1   ")ej. Then,
Ps
k=1 'rk(  Pi)(  Pi;P
j ) = " < 'a1(P
i ;P
j )+'al(P
i ;P
j )+'ai(P
i ;P
j ) 
Ps
k=1 'rk(  Pi)(P
i ;P
j ).
Therefore, voter i manipulates at (  Pi;P
j ) via P
i .
Case 2: s > s0.
Let  Pj = Pk. By Lemma 3, '(P
i ;  Pj) = "el+(1 ")e1. Then,
Ps0
k=1 'rk(  Pj)(P
i ;  Pj) =
1   " < 'a1(P
i ;P
j ) + 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) + 'ai(P
i ;P
j ) 
Ps0
k=1 'rk(  Pj)(P
i ;P
j ). Therefore,
voter j manipulates at (P
i ;  Pj) via P
j .
Summing up, we conclude that manipulation always occurs when  > 0. This
establishes the Lemma.
13Lemma 5 (i) For all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 DSl, '(Pi;Pj) = "el + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
(ii) For all Pi 2 DSl and Pj 2 Dal, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")el.
Proof: We verify part (i) rst. Let aj 2 Sl 1nfa1;akg, Pj 2 Daj, P
i 2 Dal;a1 and
P
j 2 Daj;a1. Strategy-proofness and Lemma 4 imply 'aj(P
i ;Pj) = 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) =
1   " and 1   " = 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) + 'a1(P
i ;P
j )  'aj(P
i ;Pj) + 'a1(P
i ;Pj). Therefore,
'a1(P
i ;Pj) = 0.
Next, consider Pi 2 Dal and P0
i 2 Da1;al. By strategy-proofness and the induction
hypothesis, 'al(Pi;Pj) = 'al(P
i ;Pj) = 'al(P
i ;Pj) + 'a1(P
i ;Pj) = 'al(P0
i;Pj) +
'a1(P0
i;Pj) = 'a1(P0
i;Pj) = ".
Similarly, for all Pi 2 Dal, we have 'a1(Pi;P
j ) = 0. Let P0
j 2 Da1;aj. Strategy-
proofness and Lemma 3 imply 'aj(Pi;Pj) = 'aj(Pi;P
j ) = 'aj(Pi;P
j )+'a1(Pi;P
j ) =
'aj(Pi;P0
j) + 'a1(Pi;P0
j) = 'a1(Pi;P0
j) = 1   ".
Therefore, '(Pi;Pj) = "el + (1   ")ej for all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 Daj where aj 2
Sl 1nfa1;akg. By unanimity and Lemma 3, we conclude that '(Pi;Pj) = "el + (1  
")eb(r1(Pj)) for all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 DSl.
The proof of part (ii) is the symmetric counterpart of the proof of part (i) and is
therefore omitted.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we have proved that '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi))+
(1 ")eb(r1(Pj)) for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl. This completes the verication of Step 2 and hence
the proof of the theorem.
We observe that Condition H is a strong condition and imposing it on the connec-
tivity graph of a linked domain constitutes a signicant strengthening of the linked
domain condition. We note some implications of Theorem 4 below.
Remark 4 The Free Pair at the Top domain (FPT domain) (Aswal et al. (2003)) in
which every two alternatives are connected, is a linked domain satisfying Condition H
(any alternative could be a hub) and is consequently a random dictatorship domain.
This partially addresses an open question in Sen (2011): is the FPT domain a random
dictatorship domain for any arbitrary number of voter greater than two?
Remark 5 It was noted in Aswal et al. (2003) that the minimal cardinality of a linked
domain is 4m 6. It is also possible to construct a linked domain satisfying Condition
H of the same cardinality. This can be done as follows: a1  a2;a2  a3;a1  a3
and aj  a1, aj  a2 for all j = 4;:::;m. We can therefore nd \small" random
dictatorship domains - those that grow linearly in the number of alternatives.
5.2 Strongly Linked Domains with Condition TS
In this subsection we provide another condition that ensures that a domain is a random
dictatorship domain. Our approach here is to strengthen the notion of connectedness
of alternatives along the lines initiated in Chatterji et al. (2010).
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nition 16 A pair of alternatives a, b is strongly connected (denoted by a  b) if
there exist Pi, P0
i 2 D such that
(i) r1(Pi) = a and r2(Pi) = b,
(ii) r1(P0
i) = b and r2(P0
i) = a,
(iii) rk(Pi) = rk(P0
i), k = 3;:::;m.
In other words, a and b are stongly connected if it is possible to nd an ordering in
the domain where a and b are rst and second ranked and it is possible to 
ip a and b
while keeping the position of all other alternatives xed.
Denition 17 A strongly linked domain is dened in exactly the same way as a linked
domain except that the notion of connectedness is replaced by strong connectedness.
A strongly linked domain has stronger restrictions embedded in it than a linked
domain. However, they are not necessarily randomly dictatorial. This is easily seen
from domain DL in Section 3.1 - the domain described in Appendix A can be specied
to be strongly linked. An additional condition needs to be imposed to make a strongly
linked domain a random dictatorship domain.
Denition 18 A domain satises Condition TS if for all a;b 2 A, either a  b, or
there exists c 2 A such that a  c and b  c.
In other words, every alternative is strongly connected to any other alternative in at
most two steps. The counterpart of this condition for connectedness is clearly weaker
than Condition H. If the graphs in Figure 2 (e) and (f) are interpreted in terms of
strong connectedness, then they represent strongly linked domains satisfying Condition
TS.
Theorem 5 A strongly linked domain satisfying Condition TS is a random dictator-
ship domain.
Proof: Let D be a strongly linked domain satisfying Condition TS. Since domain
D satises the triple property (the strong connectedness implies the connectedness),
it suces as in Theorem 4 to show that every strategy-proof and unanimous RSCF
' : D2 ! L(A) is a random dictatorship. Let I = fi;jg. For notational simplicity,
we assume that the function  in Denition 17 is the identity function. Dene Sl =
fa1;a2;:::;alg, l = 3;:::;m. Our proof proceeds by establishing the same two steps
as those in the proof of Theorem 4.
Step 1. There exists " 2 [0;1] such that for all Pi;Pj 2 DS3, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) +
(1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Step 2. If for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl 1, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)), then
for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
The following lemma establishes Step 1.
15Lemma 6 There exists " 2 [0;1] such that for all Pi;Pj 2 DS3, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi))+
(1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Proof: Since a1;a2;a3 form a triple of strong connectedness, which implies the triple
of connectedness, the lemma follows from Theorem 2 in Sen (2011).
To verify Step 2, we use the following induction hypothesis.
Induction Hypothesis Level 1: for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl 1, l > 3, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) +
(1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
We will show that for all Pi;Pj 2 DSl, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Pick an arbitrary l > 3 and a 2 Sl 1. We say that al is strongly connected to a
by a chain of length t located in Sl if there exists a sequence fykgt+2
k=1  Sl of length
t + 2 such that al = y1, a = yt+2 and yk  yk+1, k = 1;:::;t + 1. We let Tt(al;Sl)
denote the set of the alternatives a 2 Sl 1 satisfying the following two properties: (i)
a is strongly connected to al by a chain of length t located in Sl and (ii) there does not
exist a chain of length strictly less than t located in Sl connecting al and a.5
It is evident that Ts(al;Sl)\Ts0(al;Sl) = ; whenever s 6= s0. Moreover, it also follows
that (i) Ts(al;Sl) = ; implies that Ts0(al;Sl) = ; for all s0 > s, (ii) [t0Tt(al;Sl) = Sl 1
and (iii) if a 2 Ts(al;Sl) with s > 0, there exists b 2 Ts 1(al;Sl) such that b  a. The
next lemma considers T0(al;Sl).
Lemma 7 (i) For all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 DT0(al;Sl), '(Pi;Pj) = "el+(1 ")eb(r1(Pj)).
(ii) For all Pi 2 DT0(al;Sl) and Pj 2 Dal, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")el.
Proof: We show part (i) rst. Let as 2 T0(al;Sl). Since al  as (recall that [al 
as] ) [al  as]), Lemmas 1 and 2 in Sen (2011) imply that for all Pi 2 Dal and
Pj 2 Das, there exists  2 [0;1] such that '(Pi;Pj) =  el + (1   )es. Now, pick
at 2 T0(al;Sl)nfasg,6  Pi 2 Dal;at,  P
i 2 Dat;al and Pj 2 Das. Strategy-proofness
and Level 1 induction hypothesis imply  = 'al(  Pi;Pj) = 'al(  Pi;Pj) + 'at(  Pi;Pj) =
'al(  P
i ;Pj) + 'at(  P
i ;Pj) = 'at(  P
i ;Pj) = ". By symmetric arguments, part (ii) also
holds.
To exhaust all alternatives in Sl 1, we provide another induction hypothesis as
follows.
Induction Hypothesis Level 2: Fix an arbitrary l  m. Suppose that for all 0  t0 < t
and either Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 D[t0
k=0Tk(al;Sl) or Pi 2 D[t0
k=0Tk(al;Sl) and Pj 2 Dal, we have
that '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
We will show that for all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 DTt(al;Sl), or Pi 2 DTt(al;Sl) and Pj 2 Dal,
we have '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
5We use an example to explain the chain. Let Figure 2 (e) denote a strong connectivity graph of a
strongly linked domain. Let the one to one function  be the identity function. Considering a1 and a5, then
fa5;a3;a2;a4;a1g, fa5;a3;a2;a1g and fa5;a3;a1g are chains of length 3, 2 and 1 located in S5 respectively.
Meanwhile, T0(a5;S5) = fa3;a4g, T1(a5;S5) = fa1;a2g and Tt(a5;S5) = ; for all t  2.
6Denition of strongly linked domains (Denition 17) implies that jT0(al;Sl)j  2.
16Lemma 8 (i) For all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 DTt(al;Sl), '(Pi;Pj) = "el+(1 ")eb(r1(Pj)).
(ii) For all Pi 2 DTt(al;Sl) and Pj 2 Dal, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")el.
Proof: Pick aj 2 Tt(al;Sl) with t > 0. According to Condition TS, there exists ai 2 A
such that ai  al and ai  aj. There are two cases to consider: ai 2 Sl 1 and
ai = 2 Sl 1.7 The proof of Lemma 8 follows the following 6 claims. We verify part (i)
rst. Claim 1 below consider ai 2 Sl 1.
Claim 1: (i) For all Pi 2 Dfal;ajg 8 and Pj 2 Dai, '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")ei.
(ii) For all Pi 2 Dai and Pj 2 Dfal;ajg, '(Pi;Pj) = "ei + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)).
Since ai 2 Sl 1, it must be the case that ai 2 T0(al;Sl) and aj 2 T1(al;Sl). The
claim then follows from Lemma 7 and the Level 1 induction hypothesis. This completes
the verication of Claim 1.
Next, we will show that the same conclusions hold when ai = 2 Sl 1. Now, it must be
the case that aj 2 Tt(al;Sl) where t > 1. Since ai = 2 Sl 1, we can assume that al  as,
where as 2 T0(al;Sl) (by Denition 17) and aj  ak, where ak 2 Tt 1(al;Sl), t > 1
(by property (iii) of Tt(al;Sl) above). Since t > 1, it is evident that as 6= ak. The next
three claims assume that ai = 2 Sl 1.
Claim 2: (i) For some  Pi 2 Dal;as and  Pj 2 Daj;ak, '(  Pi;  Pj) = "el + (1   ")ej.
(ii) For some  Pi 2 Daj;ak and  Pj 2 Dal;as, '(  Pi;  Pj) = "ej + (1   ")el.
We rst consider part (i). By strong connectedness, we can assume that there
exist P0
i 2 Das;al and P0
j 2 Dak;aj such that r(P0
i) = r(  Pi) and r(P0
j) = r(  Pj),
 = 3;:::;m. Now, since as;aj 2 Sl 1, by strategy-proofness and the Level 1 induc-
tion hypothesis, we have that 'al(  Pi;  Pj) + 'as(  Pi;  Pj) = 'al(P0
i;  Pj) + 'as(P0
i;  Pj) =
'as(P0
i;  Pj) = ". Similarly, since ak 2 Tt 1(al;Sl), by strategy-proofness and the
Level 2 induction hypothesis, we have that 'aj(  Pi;  Pj) + 'ak(  Pi;  Pj) = 'aj(  Pi;P0
j) +
'ak(  Pi;P0
j) = 'aj(  Pi;P0
j) = 1   ". Therefore, for all a = 2 fal;aj;as;akg, 'a(  Pi;  Pj) = 0.
Suppose 'as(  Pi;  Pj) =  > 0. Then, 'al(  Pi;  Pj) = "   . Assume al = rk1(  Pj) and
as = rk2(  Pj). Then, al = rk1(P0
j) and as = rk2(P0
j). We have two cases.
Case 1: k1 < k2.
Fix Pj 2 Dal. By unanimity, 'al(  Pi;Pj) = 1. Hence,
Pk1
=1 'r(  Pj)(  Pi;  Pj) =
'aj(  Pi;  Pj) + 'ak(  Pi;  Pj) + 'al(  Pi;  Pj) = 1    <
Pk1
=1 'r(  Pj)(  Pi;Pj). Then, voter j
would manipulate at (  Pi;  Pj) via Pj.
Case 2: k1 > k2.
7We provide an example to show both cases of ai 2 Sl 1 and ai = 2 Sl 1. Let Figure 2 (f) denote the strong
connectivity graph of a strongly linked domain. Then, the domain satises Condition TS. Furthermore, it
is true that for every one to one function  : f1;:::;7g ! f1;:::;7g satised by a domain in Denition 17,
a7 = a(7). Let function  be the identity function. We rst consider a1, a5 and S4. We know that a1  a3,
a3  a5 and a3 2 S4. Next, considering a1, a6 and S5, we know that a1  a7, a7  a6 and a7 = 2 S5.
8Recall that Dfal;ajg is dierent from Dal;aj. In the following proof, we never use Dal;aj, for we have no
idea on whether Dal;aj = ; or not.
17By the Level 2 induction hypothesis,
Pk2
=1 'r(P0
j)(  Pi;P0
j) = 'ak(  Pi;P0
j) = 1   " <
1 "+ = 'aj(  Pi;  Pj)+'ak(  Pi;  Pj)+'as(  Pi;  Pj) =
Pk2
=1 'r(P0
j)(  Pi;  Pj). Then, voter
j would manipulate at (  Pi;P0
j) via  Pj.
Now, 'as(  Pi;  Pj) = 0. Next, suppose that 'ak(  Pi;  Pj) =  > 0. Then, 'aj(  Pi;  Pj) =
1 " . Assume aj = rt1(  Pi) and ak = rt2(  Pi). Then, aj = rt1(P0
i) and ak = rt2(P0
i).
We have two cases.
Case 1: t1 < t2.
Fix Pi 2 Daj. By unanimity, 'aj(Pi;  Pj) = 1. Hence,
Pt1
=1 'r(  Pi)(  Pi;  Pj) =
'al(  Pi;  Pj) + 'as(  Pi;  Pj) + 'aj(  Pi;  Pj) = 1    <
Pt1
=1 'r(  Pi)(Pi;  Pj). Then, voter i
would manipulate at (  Pi;  Pj) via Pi.
Case 2: t1 > t2.
By the Level 1 induction hypothesis,
Pt2
=1 'r(P0
i)(P0
i;  Pj) = 'as(P0
i;  Pj) = " <
" +  = 'al(  Pi;  Pj) + 'as(  Pi;  Pj) + 'ak(  Pi;  Pj) =
Pt2
=1 'r(P0
i)(  Pi;  Pj). Then, voter i
would manipulate at (P0
i;  Pj) via  Pi.
Then, 'ak(  Pi;  Pj) = 0. Therefore, '(  Pi;  Pj) = "el + (1   ")ej.
By symmetric arguments, part (ii) also holds. This completes the verication of
Claim 2.
Claim 3: (i) For all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 Dai, '(Pi;Pj) = "el + (1   ")ei.
(ii) For all Pi 2 Dai and Pj 2 Dal, '(Pi;Pj) = "ei + (1   ")el.
We rst consider part (i). Since al  ai (recall [al  ai] ) [al  ai]), Lemmas 1
and 2 in Sen (2011) imply that there exists  2 [0;1] such that for all Pi 2 Dal and
Pj 2 Dai, '(Pi;Pj) =  el + (1   )ei.
Next, x  Pi 2 Dal;as,  Pj 2 Daj;ak, where prole (  Pi;  Pj) satises Claim 2 (i),
P
i 2 Das;al and P
j 2 Daj;ai. Since as;aj 2 Sl 1, by strategy-proofness and the Level 1
induction hypothesis, we have 'al(  Pi;P
j )+'as(  Pi;P
j ) = 'al(P
i ;P
j )+'as(P
i ;P
j ) =
'as(P
i ;P
j ) = ". Meanwhile, by strategy-proofness and Claim 2 (i), 'aj(  Pi;P
j ) =
'aj(  Pi;  Pj) = 1   ". Therefore, 'ai(  Pi;P
j ) = 0. Now, x  P
j 2 Dai;aj. Strategy-
proofness implies 1    = 'ai(  Pi;  P
j ) = 'ai(  Pi;  P
j ) + 'aj(  Pi;  P
j ) = 'ai(  Pi;P
j ) +
'aj(  Pi;P
j ) = 'aj(  Pi;P
j ) = 1   ". Therefore,  = ".
In conclusion, for all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 Dai, '(Pi;Pj) = "el + (1   ")ei.
By symmetric arguments, we have that for all Pi 2 Dai and Pj 2 Dal, '(Pi;Pj) =
"ei + (1   ")el. This completes the verication of Claim 3.
Claim 4: (i) For all Pi 2 Daj and Pj 2 Dai, '(Pi;Pj) = "ej + (1   ")ei.
(ii) For all Pi 2 Dai and Pj 2 Daj, '(Pi;Pj) = "ei + (1   ")ej.
This Claim is similar to Claim 3 but its proof follows from Claim 2 and the Level
2 induction hypothesis while the proof for Claim 3 follows from Claim 2 and the Level
1 induction hypothesis. This completes the verication of Claim 4.
We have shown that irrespective of whether ai 2 Sl 1 or ai = 2 Sl 1, '(Pi;Pj) =
"eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)) holds for all Pi 2 Dfal;ajg and Pj 2 Dai or Pi 2 Dai and
Pj 2 Dfal;ajg.
18For next claim, let P
i 2 Dal;ai and P
j 2 Daj;ai.
Claim 5: '(P
i ;P
j ) = "el + (1   ")ej.
Suppose that the Claim is false. Similar to Lemma 4, we can assume that 'ai(P
i ;P
j ) =
 > 0. Since al  ai and aj  ai, we can assume that there exist  P
i 2 Dai;al and
 P
j 2 Dai;aj such that rk(  P
j ) = rk(P
j ), k = 3;:::;m. Since Claims 1, 3 (i) and 4 (ii)
imply that 'ai(P
i ;  P
j ) + 'aj(P
i ;  P
j ) = 1   " and 'ai(  P
i ;P
j ) + 'al(  P
i ;P
j ) = ", by
strategy-proofness, we have that 'aj(P
i ;P
j ) = 1   "    and 'al(P
i ;P
j ) = "   .
Assume al = rs(P
j ). It is evident that s  3. Then, strong connectedness implies that
al = rs(  P
j ). According to Claims 1 and 3 (i),
Ps 1
k=1 'rk(  P
j )(P
i ;  P
j ) = 1 ". Next, by
strong connectedness, we know that frk(P
j )gs 1
k=1 = frk(  P
j )gs 1
k=1. Hence, by strategy-
proofness, we have that
Ps 1
k=1 'rk(P
j )(P
i ;P
j ) =
Ps 1
k=1 'rk(  P
j )(P
i ;  P
j ) = 1 ". There-
fore,
Ps
k=1 'rk(P
j )(P
i ;P
j ) =
Ps 1
k=1 'rk(P
j )(P
i ;P
j ) + 'al(P
i ;P
j ) = 1   . Now,
x Pj 2 Dal. By unanimity,
Ps
k=1 'rk(P
j )(P
i ;P
j ) = 1    < 1 = 'al(P
i ;Pj) =
Ps
k=1 'rk(P
j )(P
i ;Pj). Therefore voter j manipulates at (P
i ;P
j ) via Pj. This com-
pletes the verication of Claim 5.
Claim 6: For all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 Daj, we have '(Pi;Pj) = "el + (1   ")ej.
The proof of this claim follows from Lemma 5.9
By symmetric arguments, it follows that '(Pi;Pj) = "ej +(1 ")el for all Pi 2 Daj
and Pj 2 Dal. This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
We can now complete the proof of the Theorem. We have shown that under the
Level 1 induction hypothesis, the Level 2 induction hypothesis is established. With
unanimity, this implies that for all Pi 2 Dal and Pj 2 DSl, or Pi 2 DSl and Pj 2 Dal,
we have '(Pi;Pj) = "eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)) as required, to complete Step 2.
Remark 6 It is easy to construct domains that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4
but not of Theorem 5. The key step in such a construction is to make the notions of
connectedness and strong connectedness equivalent; i.e., whenever a  b, we also have
a  b for all a;b 2 A. In this setting, Condition TS is weaker than Condition H as is
illustrated by the connectivity graphs in Figure 2 (e) and (f).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that dictatorial domains are not necessarily random dic-
tatorship domains. We have provided additional conditions on a class of dictatorial
domains to ensure that they are random dictatorship domains. These additional con-
ditions are quite restrictive and they suggest that a large class of dictatorial domains
admit strategy-proof random social choice functions satisfying unanimity that are not
random dictatorships.
9In the verication of Claim 6, we only need the conditions that al  ai and aj  ai, which are implied
by the strong connectedness. Furthermore, in the proof of Lemma 5, we do not apply the full property of
the hub a1 (the hub is connected to every alternative else). Therefore, we could apply the same argument
of Lemma 5 to the verication of Claim 6.
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Appendix A: The Domain DL
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4 a4 a4 a4 a5 a5 a5 a5 a6 a6 a6 a7 a7 a7 a7
a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a1 a4 a1 a3 a5 a7 a1 a4 a6 a7 a2 a5 a7 a2 a4 a5 a6
 a2 a2    a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2  a2 a2  a2 a2 a2
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
a2     a2                
Table 1: Domain DL
In the table above, dots on a particular ordering signify that alternatives not spec-
ied are arbitrarily ordered.
Appendix B: The Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: It suces to construct a unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial RSCF
' : D2
NRD ! L(A). Let I = fi;jg. Similar to the RSCF in the proof of Proposition 1,
consider the RSCF ' below:
'(Pi;Pj) =
(
"eb(x) + eb(r2(Pj)) + (1   "   )eb(y) if Pi 2 Dx
NRD and Pj 2 D
y
NRD
"eb(r1(Pi)) + (1   ")eb(r1(Pj)) otherwise.
where 0 < " < 1 and 0 <   min(";1   ").
It is evident that RSCF ' is unanimous and not a random dictatorship. To check
the strategy-proofness of ', it suces to consider only the ve cased below.
Case 1: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pj 2 D
y
NRD and Pi = 2 Dx
NRD. Voter i considers a
manipulation via P0
i 2 Dx
NRD.
Let u 2 U(Pi). The loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) =
"u(r1(Pi))+u(y) "u(x) u(r2(Pj)). If yPir2(Pj), then Ui(Pi;Pj) Ui(P0
i;Pj) 
0. Suppose r2(Pj)Piy. Then Pi = 2 D
y
NRD, which implies that Pi 2 D
Anfx;yg
NRD . Since
r2(Pj) 2 S(y), applying the third restriction of the Condition NRD, we have
Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) = "
h
u(r1(Pi))   u(r2(Pj))
i
+ ("   )
h
u(r2(Pj))   u(y)
i
 
"
h
u(y)   u(x)
i
 0.
Case 2: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pj 2 D
y
NRD and Pi 2 Dx
NRD. Voter i considers a
manipulation via P0
i = 2 Dx
NRD.
Let u 2 U(Pi). Since Pi 2 Dx
NRD, r2(Pj)Piy by the second restriction of the Con-
dition NRD. Hence, the loss from misrepresentation is Ui(Pi;Pj)   Ui(P0
i;Pj) =
"
h
u(x)   u(r1(P0
i))
i
+ 
h
u(r2(Pj))   u(y)
i
 0.
22Case 3: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pi 2 Dx
NRD and Pj = 2 D
y
NRD. Voter j considers a
manipulation via P0
j 2 D
y
NRD.
Let u 2 U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi;Pj)   Uj(Pi;P0
j) =
(1   "   )
h
u(r1(Pj))   u(y)
i
+ 
h
u(r1(Pj))   u(r2(P0
j))
i
 0.
Case 4: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pi 2 Dx
NRD and Pj 2 D
y
NRD. Voter j considers a
manipulation via P0
j = 2 D
y
NRD.
Let u 2 U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi;Pj)   Uj(Pi;P0
j) =
(1   "   )
h
u(y)   u(r1(P0
j))
i
+ 
h
u(r2(Pj))   u(r1(P0
j))
i
 0.
Case 5: The prole is (Pi;Pj) where Pi 2 Dx
NRD and Pj 2 D
y
NRD. Voter j considers a
manipulation via P0
j 2 D
y
NRD and P0
j 6= Pj.
Let u 2 U(Pj). The loss from misrepresentation is Uj(Pi;Pj)   Uj(Pi;P0
j) =

h
u(r2(Pj))   u(r2(P0
j))
i
 0.
We conclude that RSCF ' is strategy-proof.
Appendix C: The Proof of Theorem 3
In this section we provide a proof of Theorem 3. In fact, we prove a stronger version
of the Theorem by using a weaker but slightly more complicated condition than the
triple property. We begin by describing this condition.
For an ordering Pi 2 D and a 2 A, we let B(Pi;a) denote the set of alternatives
that are strictly better than a according to Pi, i.e., [x 2 B(Pi;a)] ) [xPia], while
W(Pi;a) denotes the set of alternatives that are strictly worse than a according to
Pi, i.e., [x 2 W(Pi;a)] ) [aPix]. For a prole P 2 DN, let (P) = fr1(Pi)gN
i=1.
For any i 2 I and prole P 2 DN, (P i) denotes the set of alternatives that are
rst-ranked by all voters other than i. For a prole P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, dene
W(P) = [N
i=1W

Pi;max(Pi;(P i))

.
Denition 19 A domain D satises Richness Condition  if there exist P1;P2;P3 2 D
with j(P1;P2;P3)j = 3 such that W(P1;P2;P3) = A.
If domain D satises the triple property, there exist alternatives a;b and c, and
orderings P1;P2 and P3 such that r1(P1) = a, r2(P1) = b, r1(P2) = b, r2(P2) = c,
r1(P3) = c and r2(P3) = a. The orderings P1;P2 and P3 satisfy Richness Condition .
Henceforth, we assume that domain D satises Minimal Richness (Denition 14)
and Richness Condition .
An additional piece of notation that we shall be using throughout the proof is the
following: for all a;b 2 A, I(a;b) is the indicator function where I(a;b) = 1 if a = b
and I(a;b) = 0 if a 6= b.
The following denition serves as a critical bridge in the proof of Theorem 3.
23Denition 20 A unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is a quasi-
random dictatorship, if there exists f"kgN
k=1  0 with
PN
k=1 "k = 1 such that for all
P 2 DN, where there exist i;j 2 I that Pi = Pj, '(P) =
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)).
The random dictatorship is stronger than quasi-random dictatorship, for quasi-
random dictatorship only considers those proles of preferences with at least two voters
sharing a same preference ordering and the outcome under such a prole of preferences
is a convex combination of N (deterministic) dictatorial social choice functions with
respect to an N-dimensional sequence f"kgN
k=1.
The proof of (b) ) (a) in Theorem 3 is trivial. We focus on showing (a) ) (b).
The proof consists in establishing three steps. Following is the outline of the proof.
Step 1. Suppose domain D satises Richness Condition . Every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF g : D2 ! L(A) is a random dictatorship ) every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF ' : D3 ! L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship. This is shown in
Proposition 4. 
Step 2. Every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF g : DN 1 ! L(A), N > 3, is a
random dictatorship ) every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is
a quasi-random dictatorship. This is shown in Proposition 5. 
Step 3. Suppose for all 2  t < N, every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF
g : Dt ! L(A), is a random dictatorship. A unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF
' : DN ! L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship ) ' is a random dictatorship. This is
shown in Proposition 6. 
Note that we only use Richness Condition  in the verication of Step 1. Thus the
induction problem is solved in the way shown by the arrows in the diagram below.
Number of voters 2 3 4 ::: :::
::: :::
::: N   1 N
Quasi Random Dictatorship
Random Dictatorship Domain q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q


  >
? 

  >
? 

  > 3 3 3
? ?
Proposition 4 Let D be a minimally rich domain satisfying Richness Condition .
Suppose every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF g : D2 ! L(A) is a random dicta-
torship. Then every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ' : D3 ! L(A) is a quasi-
random dictatorship.
Proof: Dene three RSCF's as follows: g(2;3)(P1;P2) = '(P1;P2;P2), g(1;3)(P1;P2) =
'(P1;P2;P1) and g(1;2)(P1;P3) = '(P1;P1;P3) for all P1;P2;P3 2 D. According to
Lemma 3 in Sen (2011), we know that RSCF's g(2;3), g(1;3) and g(1;2) are random
24dictatorships. Then, there exist "1, "2, "3  0 such that for all P1;P2;P3 2 D,
'(P1;P2;P2) = "1 eb(r1(P1)) + (1   "1)eb(r1(P2))
'(P1;P2;P1) = (1   "2)eb(r1(P1)) + "2 eb(r1(P2))
'(P1;P1;P3) = (1   "3)eb(r1(P1)) + "3 eb(r1(P3))
To establish that ' is a quasi-random dictatorship, it suces to show that "1+"2+
"3 = 1. Now, x a prole P = (P
1;P
2;P
3), satisfying Richness Condition . Since
W(P) = A implies that (P)  W(P), we could assume without loss of generality
that r1(P
1) = a, r1(P
2) = b, r1(P
3) = c, bP
1 c, cP
2 a and aP
3 b. Furthermore, assume
b = rs(P
1) and c = rs0(P
1). Hence, 1 < s < s0. By strategy-proofness, we know that for
all t  1,
Pt
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P
2;P
2;P
3) 
Pt
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) 
Pt
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P
1;P
1;P
3).
Since '(P
2;P
2;P
3) = g(1;2)(P
2;P
3) and '(P
1;P
1;P
3) = g(1;2)(P
1;P
3), we have that
for all t  1,
Pt
k=1 g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
2;P
3) 
Pt
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) 
Pt
k=1 g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
1;P
3).
Next, since g(1;2) is a random dictatorship with respect to f1   "3;"3g, we have
s X
k=1
g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
2;P
3) =
s0 1 X
k=1
g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
2;P
3) = g
(1;2)
b (P
2;P
3) = 1   "3
s X
k=1
g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
1;P
3) =
s0 1 X
k=1
g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
1;P
3) = g(1;2)
a (P
1;P
3) = 1   "3
s0 X
k=1
g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
2;P
3) = g
(1;2)
b (P
2;P
3) + g(1;2)
c (P
2;P
3) = 1
s0 X
k=1
g
(1;2)
rk(P
1 )(P
1;P
3) = g(1;2)
a (P
1;P
3) + g(1;2)
c (P
1;P
3) = 1
Therefore,
Ps
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) =
Ps0 1
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) = 1 "3 and
Ps0
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) =
1. Hence, 'c(P) =
Ps0
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) 
Ps0 1
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P) = "3 and
Ps
k=1 'rk(P
1 )(P)+
'c(P) = 1. Then, we know that for all x 2 W(P
1;b)nfcg, 'x(P) = 0. Symmetrically,
we can obtain 'a(P) = "1, 'x(P) = 0 for all x 2 W(P
2;c)nfag; and 'b(P) = "2,
'x(P) = 0 for all x 2 W(P
3;a)nfbg. In conclusion, for all x 2 W(P)nfa;b;cg,
'x(P) = 0. Furthermore, since W(P) = A, we have that 1 =
P
x2A 'x(P) =
P
x2W(P) 'x(P) = 'a(P) + 'b(P) + 'c(P) = "1 + "2 + "3. This completes the
verication of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Let D be a minimally rich domain. Suppose that every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF g : DN 1 ! L(A) is a random dictatorship for N > 3. Then every
unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship.
Proof: This proposition holds when m = 3, since a domain with exact three alterna-
tives is a random dictatorship domain for the case of N  1 voters i it is the complete
25domain.10 We therefore need to consider m  4. The proof of the Proposition follows
from Lemmas 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Let ' : DN ! L(A) be a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Pick two arbitrary
voters, say i and j. Dene a RSCF g(i;j) as follows: for all Pi 2 D and P fi;jg 2 DN 2,
g(i;j)(Pi;P fi;jg) = '(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg).
Lemma 9 The RSCF g(i;j) is a random dictatorship for all i;j 2 I.
Proof: This lemma follows from Lemma 3 in Sen (2011). According to the proof of
Lemma 3 in Sen (2011), the unanimity and strategy-proofness of ' imply that g(i;j)
is unanimous and strategy-proof. Then by the hypothesis of Proposition 5, we know
that g(i;j) is a random dictatorship.
Fix i;j 2 I. It follows from Lemma 9 above that there exist "(i;j), "
(i;j)
k  0 for
all k 6= i;j such that "(i;j) +
P
k6=i;j "
(i;j)
k = 1 and satisfying the following property:
'(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg) = g(i;j)(Pi;P fi;jg) = "(i;j) eb(r1(Pi))+
P
k6=i;j "
(i;j)
k eb(r1(Pk)) for all Pi 2
D and P fi;jg 2 DN 2. The next lemma shows that we could split the probability
"(i;j) appropriately into two parts and together with all "
(i;j)
k , k 6= i;j, construct a new
N-dimensional sequence of probabilities, which are able to be applied to all proles of
preferences where voter i and j share a same preference ordering.
Lemma 10 Pick i;j 2 I. For all P 2 DN with Pi = Pj there exists f
(i;j;s;t)
k gN
k=1  0
with
PN
k=1 
(i;j;s;t)
k = 1, where s;t 2 Infi;jg and s 6= t, such that '(P) =
PN
k=1 
(i;j;s;t)
k eb(r1(Pk)).
Proof: Now, i;j;s;t are mutually distinct. For every l 6= i;j;s;t, we consider a prole
P(l) = (Pi;Pi;Ps;Ps;Pl;P fi;j;s;t;lg) 11 where r1(Pi) = a, r1(Ps) = b, r1(Pl) = c and
(P fi;j;s;t;lg) \ fa;b;cg = ; (recall that m  4). Standard properties of g(i;j) imply
that 'a(P(l)) = "(i;j), 'b(P(l)) = "
(i;j)
s + "
(i;j)
t and 'c(P(l)) = "
(i;j)
l . Meanwhile, by
g(s;t), 'a(P(l)) = "
(s;t)
i +"
(s;t)
j , 'b(P(l)) = "(s;t) and 'c(P(l)) = "
(s;t)
l . Therefore, "(i;j) =
"
(s;t)
i + "
(s;t)
j , "(s;t) = "
(i;j)
s + "
(i;j)
t and "
(i;j)
l = "
(s;t)
l for all l 6= i;j;s;t. Since "(i;j) +
P
k6=i;j "
(i;j)
k = 1 and "(s;t) +
P
k6=s;t "
(s;t)
k = 1, we have "
(s;t)
i + "
(s;t)
j +
P
k6=i;j "
(i;j)
k = 1
and "
(i;j)
s + "
(i;j)
t +
P
k6=s;t "
(s;t)
k = 1.
Setting 
(i;j;s;t)
i = "
(s;t)
i , 
(i;j;s;t)
j = "
(s;t)
j , 
(i;j;s;t)
s = "
(i;j)
s , 
(i;j;s;t)
t = "
(i;j)
t and

(i;j;s;t)
l = "
(s;t)
l = "
(i;j)
l for all l 6= i;j;s;t, we have 
(i;j;s;t)
k  0, k = 1;:::;N and
PN
k=1 
(i;j;s;t)
k = 1.
Fix a prole P = (Pi;Pj;P fi;jg) with Pi = Pj 2 D and P fi;jg 2 DN 2. It fol-
lows from properties of g(i;j) that 'r1(Pi)(P) = "(i;j) +
P
k6=i;j "
(i;j)
k I(r1(Pk);r1(Pi)) =
10The suciency part is shown in Gibbard (1977), Duggan (1996) and Sen (2011). The unique seconds
property in Aswal et al. (2003) implies the necessity. Let a domain satisfy the unique seconds property.
Then this domain is not dictatorial and hence not randomly dictatorial. Furthermore, when m = 3, every
domain other than the complete domain satises the unique seconds property.
11If N = 4, we let P = (Pi;Pi;Ps;Ps) where r1(Pi) = a and r1(Ps) = b.
26PN
k=1 
(i;j;s;t)
k I(r1(Pk);r1(Pi)) and for all x 2 Anfr1(Pi)g, 'x(P) =
P
k6=i;j "
(i;j)
k I(r1(Pk);x) =
PN
k=1 
(i;j;s;t)
k I(r1(Pk);x).
Note that f
(i;j;s;t)
k gN
k=1 = f
(s;t;i;j)
k gN
k=1, where i;j;s;t are mutually distinct. The
next lemma shows that sequence f
(i;j;s;t)
k gN
k=1 is independent of fs;tg whenever s;t 2
Infi;jg and s 6= t.
Lemma 11 Fix i;j 2 I. For all s;t;  s; t 2 Infi;jg, where s 6= t and  s 6=  t, we have
f
(i;j;s;t)
k gN
k=1 = f
(i;j;  s; t)
k gN
k=1.
Proof: According to Lemma 10, 
(i;j;s;t)
i = "
(s;t)
i , 
(i;j;s;t)
j = "
(s;t)
j , "
(s;t)
i + "
(s;t)
j = "(i;j)
and 
(i;j;s;t)
k = "
(i;j)
k for all k 6= i;j. Meanwhile, 
(i;j;  s; t)
i = "
( s; t)
i , 
(i;j;  s; t)
j = "
( s; t)
j ,
"
( s; t)
i +"
( s; t)
j = "(i;j) and 
(i;j;  s; t)
k = "
(i;j)
k for all k 6= i;j. Therefore, 
(i;j;s;t)
i +
(i;j;s;t)
j =

(i;j;  s; t)
i + 
(i;j;  s; t)
j and 
(i;j;s;t)
k = 
(i;j;  s; t)
k for all k 6= i;j.
Next, given a prole P = (Pi;P i) where r1(Pi) = a and for all k;l 2 Infig,
Pk = Pl = 2 Da, then by both g(s;t) and g( s; t) respectively, we have 'a(P) = "
(s;t)
i and
'a(P) = "
( s; t)
i . Then, "
(s;t)
i = "
( s; t)
i and hence 
(i;j;s;t)
i = 
(i;j;  s; t)
i . Consequently,

(i;j;s;t)
j = 
(i;j;  s; t)
j .
Fix i;j 2 I. We have the following: for all P 2 DN with Pi = Pj, there ex-
ists f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1  0 with
PN
k=1 
(i;j)
k = 1 such that '(P) =
PN
k=1 
(i;j)
k eb(r1(Pk)). In
addition, f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1 = f
(j;i)
k gN
k=1. We next show that the sequence f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1 is
independent of fi;jg.
Lemma 12 For all i;j;s;t 2 I, where i 6= j and s 6= t, f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1 = f
(s;t)
k gN
k=1.
Proof: It is evident that jfi;jg\fs;tgj = 0;1 or 2. If jfi;jg\fs;tgj = 0, then i;j;s;t are
mutually distinct. Hence, f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1 = f
(i;j;s;t)
k gN
k=1 = f
(s;t;i;j)
k gN
k=1 = f
(s;t)
k gN
k=1.
Next, if jfi;jg\fs;tgj = 2, then fi;jg = fs;tg, which implies f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1 = f
(s;t)
k gN
k=1.
Now, we consider jfi;jg \ fs;tgj = 1, We can therefore assume without loss of
generality that i = s. Since N > 3, there exists another voter: voter  s and  s = 2 fi;j;tg.
For every k = 2 fi;j;tg, we consider a prole P(k) = (Pk;P k) where Pk 2 Da and
for all l;n 2 Infkg, Pl = Pn = 2 Da. By Lemma 11, it follows that 'a(P(k)) = 
(i;j)
k and
'a(P(k)) = 
(i;t)
k . Therefore, 
(i;j)
k = 
(i;t)
k for all k = 2 fi;j;tg.
From the case where jfi;jg \ f s;tgj = 0, we have 
(i;j)
j = 
( s;t)
j . Consider a prole
P = (Pj;P j) where Pj 2 Da and for all l;n 2 Infjg, Pl = Pn = 2 Da. By Lemma
11, it follows that 'a(P) = 
( s;t)
j and 'a(P) = 
(i;t)
j . Therefore, 
( s;t)
j = 
(i;t)
j . Then,

(i;j)
j = 
(i;t)
j . Similarly, 
(i;j)
t = 
(i;t)
t .
Finally, it is evident that 
(i;j)
i = 1  
P
k6=i 
(i;j)
k = 1  
P
k6=i 
(i;t)
k = 
(i;t)
i . We
therefore conclude that f
(i;j)
k gN
k=1 = f
(s;t)
k gN
k=1.
In conclusion, there exists f"kgN
k=1  0 such that
PN
k=1 "k = 1 and satisfying the
following property: for all P 2 DN such that Pi = Pj for some i;j 2 I, we have
'(P) =
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)). Therefore, ' is a quasi-random dictatorship.
27Proposition 6 Let D be a minimally rich domain. Suppose that for all 2  t < N,
every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF g : Dt ! L(A) is a random dictatorship. If
a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ' : DN ! L(A) is a quasi-random dictatorship,
then ' is a random dictatorship.
Proof: The proof proceeds in a sequence of lemmas. Let f"kgN
k=1  0 with
PN
k=1 "k = 1
be the sequence that ' satises in Denition 20.
Lemma 13 For all P 2 DN, if there exist i;j 2 I such that r1(Pi) = r1(Pj), then
'(P) =
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)).
Proof: Fix a prole P = (Pi;Pj;P fi;jg). Assume that r1(Pi) = r1(Pj) = x0 and
(P fi;jg)nfx0g = fxkgl
k=1 where 0  l  N 2 and all elements in fxkgl
k=1 are distinct.
If (P fi;jg)nfx0g = ;, then (P) = fx0g and unanimity gives the result. We complete
the proof by considering (P fi;jg)nfx0g 6= ;. By strategy-proofness and quasi-random
dictatorship, we have 'x0(P) = 'x0(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg) = "i+"j+
P
k6=i;j "k I(r1(Pk);x0) =
PN
k=1 "k I(r1(Pk);x0).
Next, for the relative rankings of all elements in fxkgl
k=1 in Pi, we could assume
without loss of generality that xt = rkt(Pi), t = 1;:::;l and k1 < k2 <  < kl. By
strategy-proofness, for all s  2,
Ps
=1 'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) 
Ps
=1 'r(Pi)(P) 
Ps
=1 'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg).
Next, according to quasi-random dictatorship, we have that for t = 1;:::;l,
kt 1 X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) =
kt 1 X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg)
= "i + "j +
X
k6=i;j
"k
h t 1 X
s=0
I(r1(Pk);xs)
i
and
kt X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) =
kt X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg)
= "i + "j +
X
k6=i;j
"k
h t X
s=0
I(r1(Pk);xs)
i
Consequently, for t = 1;:::;l,
Pkt 1
=1 'r(Pi)(P) = "i+"j+
P
k6=i;j "k
hPt 1
s=0 I(r1(Pk);xs)
i
and
Pkt
=1 'r(Pi)(P) = "i + "j +
P
k6=i;j "k
hPt
s=0 I(r1(Pk);xs)
i
. Hence, for t =
1;:::;l, 'xt(P) =
Pkt
=1 'r(Pi)(P)  
Pkt 1
=1 'r(Pi)(P) =
P
k6=i;j "k I(r1(Pk);xt) =
PN
k=1 "k I(r1(Pk);xt).
Therefore,
P
x2(P) 'x(P) 
Pl
i=0 'xi(P) =
PN
k=1 "k = 1. Then, for all x = 2 (P),
'x(P) = 0. In conclusion, '(P) =
PN
k=1 "keb(r1(Pk)).
28If m < N, then for all P 2 DN, there always exist at least two voters who share
a common maximal alternative. Then, Lemma 13 implies that ' is a random dicta-
torship. We complete the proof by considering m  N. Given a prole P 2 DN with
j(P)j = N, recall W(P) = [N
k=1W

Pk;max(Pk;(P k))

.
Lemma 14 For all P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, we have j(P) \ W(P)j  N   1.
Proof: This lemma asserts that for every prole P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, (P) and
W(P) have at least N   1 alternatives in common.
Suppose not. Then there exists P 2 DN with j(P)j = N such that j(P)\W(P)j <
N   1. Hence, there exist a;b 2 (P)nW(P). Since j(P)j = N and N  3, we know
that there exists Pi 2 Dc for some i 2 I such that c = 2 fa;bg. Let max(Pi;(P i)) = x.
If x = 2 fa;bg, we know that fa;bg  W(Pi;x) which implies that fa;bg  W(P). If
x = a, then b 2 W(Pi;x) which implies that b 2 W(P). If x = b, then a 2 W(Pi;x)
which implies that a 2 W(P). We have a contradiction.
Lemma 15 For all P 2 DN with j(P)j = N and x 2 W(P), we have 'x(P) =
PN
k=1 "k I(r1(Pk);x).
Proof: Fix voter i. Assume without loss of generality that (P i) = fxkgN 1
k=1 , xt =
rkt(Pi), t = 1;:::;N   1, k1 < k2 <  < kN 1 and x1 = r1(Pj) for some j 2 Infig.
By strategy-proofness, we have that
Ps
=1 'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) 
Ps
=1 'r(Pi)(P) 
Ps
=1 'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg) for all s  k1.
According to quasi-random dictatorship, we have the following:
k1 X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) =
k1 X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg) = "i + "j
and for t = 2;:::;N   1,
kt 1 X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) =
kt 1 X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg)
= "i + "j +
X
k6=i;j
"k
h t 1 X
s=2
I(r1(Pk);xs)
i
and
kt X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pj;Pj;P fi;jg) =
kt X
=1
'r(Pi)(Pi;Pi;P fi;jg)
= "i + "j +
X
k6=i;j
"k
h t X
s=2
I(r1(Pk);xs)
i
Then, similar to the proof of Lemma 13, we have
Pk1
=1 'r(Pi)(P) = "i + "j and
'xt(P) =
PN
k=1 "k I(r1(Pk);xt), for t = 2;:::;N 1. Since j(P)j = N and (P fi;jg) =
29fxtgN 1
t=2 , we know that 'r1(Pk)(P) = "k for all k 6= i;j. Then,
Pk1
=1 'r(Pi)(P) +
P
k6=i;j 'r1(Pk)(P) =
PN
k=1 "k = 1. Therefore, for all x 2 W(Pi;x1)nfxtgN 1
t=2 , 'x(P) =
0. In conclusion, for all x 2 W(Pi;x1), 'x(P) =
PN
k=1 "k I(r1(Pk);x).
Applying the same argument to all other voters, we have 'x(P) =
PN
k=1 "k I(r1(Pk);x)
for all x 2 W(P).
From Lemma 15, we can infer that for all P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, if (P)  W(P),
then '(P) =
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)). By Lemmas 14 and 15, we know that for every P 2 DN
with j(P)j = N, the probabilities over at least N   1 elements of (P) in '(P) are
revealed.
In the next lemma, we will identify properties that a prole P and '(P) must
satisfy if '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)). Given a prole P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, let
 Bi(P) = B

Pi;max(Pi;(P i))
/
fr1(Pi)g, i 2 I and  B(P) = \N
i=1  Bi(P).
Lemma 16 Let P 2 DN be a prole. If '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)), then the following
conditions must be satised:
(i) j(P)j = N.
(ii) There exists i 2 I such that 'r1(Pi)(P) < "i and 'r1(Pk)(P) = "k for all k 6= i.
(iii) r1(Pi) = max(Pk;(P k)) for all k 6= i.
(iv) 'r1(Pi)(P) +
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P) = "i.
(v)  B(P) 6= ;. Furthermore, there exists x 2  B(P) such that 'x(P) > 0.
Proof: (i) Since '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)), Lemma 13 implies that j(P)j = N.
(ii) According to Lemmas 14 and 15 and the hypothesis '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)),
it must be true that j(P) \ W(P)j = N   1. Assume without loss of generality
that r1(Pi) = 2 W(P). Then, by Lemma 15, we have that for all k 6= i, 'r1(Pk)(P) = "k.
Consequently, 'r1(Pi)(P)  1 
P
k6=i 'r1(Pk)(P) = "i. This implies that 'r1(Pi)(P) < "i,
otherwise '(P) =
PN
k=1 "keb(r1(Pk)).
(iii) The proof of statement (ii) shows that r1(Pi) = 2 W(P), which implies that r1(Pi) =
max(Pk;(P k)) for all k 6= i.
(iv) Assume without loss of generality that max(Pi;(P i)) = r1(Pj) for some j 2 Infig
and let r1(Pj) = rs(Pi). Then, as we showed in the proof of Lemma 15, "i + "j =
Ps
k=1 'rk(Pi)(P) =
Ps 1
k=1 'rk(Pi)(P) + 'r1(Pj)(P) = 'r1(Pi)(P) +
P
x2  Bi(P) 'x(P) +
'r1(Pj)(P). Furthermore, statement (ii) implies that 'r1(Pj)(P) = "j. Hence, 'r1(Pi)(P)+
P
x2  Bi(P) 'x(P) = "i. Next, since  Bi(P)n  B(P)  W(P) and  B(P)   Bi(P), we have
'x(P) = 0 for all x 2  Bi(P)n  B(P) by Lemma 15 and 'r1(Pi)(P)+
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P) = "i.
(v) By statements (ii) and (iv), we know that
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P) > 0, which implies that
 B(P) 6= ; and furthermore, there exists x 2  B(P) such that 'x(P) > 0.
The voter i specied in statement (ii) of Lemma 16 is called the special voter of P.
As we showed in the proof of statement (ii) of Lemma 16, we know that the peak of
30the special voter of P does not belong to W(P). It is evident that in a prole P with
'(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "keb(r1(Pk)), there exists a unique special voter.
We next show what property the sequence f"kgN
k=1 must satisfy, when there exists
a prole P such that '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "keb(r1(P
k)).
Lemma 17 If there exists P 2 DN such that '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(P
k)), then 0 <
"k < 1, k = 1;:::;N.
Proof: Suppose there exists "k = 0. Fix P
k (the kth element of P). Dene a RSCF:
g(P k) = '(P
k;P k) for all P k 2 DN 1. The strategy-proofness of ' implies that g is
strategy-proof. Next, Lemma 13 implies that g is unanimous. Furthermore, according
to Lemma 16 (v), we know that there exists x = 2 (P) such that 'x(P) > 0. There-
fore, gx(P
 k) = 'x(P
k;P
 k) > 0 where x = 2 (P
 k), which implies that RSCF g is not
a random dictatorship. This is a contradiction to the hypothesis of Proposition 6.
Next, suppose that there exists "k = 1. Then, there exists j 6= k such that "j = 0,
which would lead to the same contradiction.
In the next lemma, we show it is true that for all P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, '(P) =
PN
k=1 "keb(r1(Pk)) by contradiction. Suppose ' is not a random dictatorship. Then we
construct a RSCF h : D2 ! L(A) and show it is unanimous and strategy-proof and
not a random dictatorship, which hence contradicts the hypothesis of Proposition 6.
Lemma 18 For all P 2 DN with j(P)j = N, we have '(P) =
PN
k=1 "k eb(r1(Pk)).
Proof: Suppose RSCF ' is not a random dictatorship with respect to f"kgN
k=1. Then,
there exists P 2 DN such that '(P) 6=
PN
k=1 "keb(r1(P
k)). By Lemma 16 (ii) and (v),
we know that there exist a special voter of P and y = 2 (P) such that 'y(P) > 0.
Assume without loss of generality that voter 1 be the special voter of P. Next, pick
arbitrarily another voter, i.e., voter 2 and x P
 f1;2g (elements in P other than P
1
and P
2). By Lemma 17, we can construct the following function: for all P1;P2 2 D,
h(P1;P2) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
"1
"1+"2eb(r1(P1)) + "2
"1+"2eb(r1(P2)) if 'r1(P1)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  "1
and 'r1(P2)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  "2
1
"1+"2
h
'(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  
N P
k=3
"keb(r1(P
k))
i
otherwise
Note that Lemma 16 (ii) implies that it is impossible that 'r1(P1)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) <
"1 and 'r1(P2)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) < "2 simultaneously. Therefore, given P = (P1;P2;P
 f1;2g),
by Lemma 16 (ii) and (iv), when either 'r1(P1)(P) < "1 or 'r1(P2)(P) < "2, h(P1;P2)
must be specied as below:
if 'r1(P1)(P) < "1, then
h(P1;P2) =
1
"1 + "2
h
'r1(P1)(P)eb(r1(P1)) +
X
x2  B(P)
'x(P)eb(x) + "2 eb(r1(P2))
i
(1)
where 'r1(P1)(P) +
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P) = "1; and if 'r1(P2)(P) < "2, then
31h(P1;P2) =
1
"1 + "2
h
"1 eb(r1(P1)) + 'r1(P2)(P)eb(r1(P2)) +
X
x2  B(P)
'x(P)eb(x)
i
(2)
where 'r1(P2)(P) +
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P) = "2.
Next, we will show that h is a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Furthermore,
to complete the proof of Lemma 18, we also show that h is not a random dictatorship
which contradicts the hypothesis of Proposition 6.
Claim 1: Function h is a RSCF.
Firstly, if 'r1(P1)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  "1 and 'r1(P2)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  "2, it is evident
that hx(P1;P2)  0 for all x 2 A and
P
x2A hx(P1;P2) = 1. Secondly, if either
'r1(P1)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) < "1 or 'r1(P2)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) < "2, either equation (1) or (2)
above implies that hx(P1;P2)  0 for all x 2 A and
P
x2A hx(P1;P2) = 1. This
completes the verication of Claim 1.
Claim 2: RSCF h is unanimous.
Let r1(P1) = r1(P2) = a. Then, by Lemma 13, we know that 'a(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) =
"1+"2+
PN
k=3 "kI(a;r1(P
k)). Hence, 'r1(P1)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) = 'a(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  "1
and 'r1(P2)(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) = 'a(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g)  "2. Consequently, ha(P1;P2) =
"1
"1+"2 + "2
"1+"2 = 1. This completes the verication of Claim 2.
Claim 3: RSCF h is not a random dictatorship.
Since we have assumed that voter 1 is the special voter of P, it is true that
'r1(P
1 )(P) < "1 by Lemma 16 (ii). Consequently, h(P
1;P
2) follows from equation
(1). Next, since we have assumed that 'y(P) > 0 where y = 2 (P) in the beginning
proof of Lemma 18, we have that hy(P
1;P
2) > 0 and y = 2 (P
1;P
2), which implies
that h is not a random dictatorship. This completes the verication of Claim 3.
Claim 4: RSCF h is strategy-proof.
We consider the possible manipulation of voter 1 in h. Firstly, it is evident that the
manipulation only occurs at (P1;P2) via P0
1 where either h(P1;P2) = "1
"1+"2eb(r1(P1)) +
"2
"1+"2eb(r1(P2)) and h(P0
1;P2) = 1
"1+"2
h
'(P0
1;P2;P
 f1;2g) 
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P
k))
i
, or h(P1;P2) =
1
"1+"2
h
'(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) 
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P
k))
i
and h(P0
1;P2) = "1
"1+"2eb(r1(P0
1))+ "2
"1+"2eb(r1(P2)).
Secondly, if '(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) = "1eb(r1(P1)) + "2eb(r1(P2)) +
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P
k)), then
h(P1;P2) = "1
"1+"2eb(r1(P1))+ "2
"1+"2eb(r1(P2)) = 1
"1+"2
h
'(P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) 
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P
k))
i
,
which implies that there exists no manipulation at (P1;P2) via P0
1 or at (P0
1;P2) via P1.
Therefore, given two proles P = (P1;P2;P
 f1;2g) and P0 = (P0
1;P2;P
 f1;2g) such
that '(P) 6= "1eb(r1(P1)) + "2eb(r1(P2)) +
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P
k)) and '(P0) 6= "1eb(r1(P0
1)) +
"2eb(r1(P2)) +
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P
k)), the manipulation at (P1;P2) via P0
1 may occur in fol-
lowing 4 cases. 12
12Since '(P) 6= "1eb(r1(P1)) + "2eb(r1(P2)) +
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P 
k )) and '(P0) 6= "1eb(r1(P 0
1)) + "2eb(r1(P2)) +
PN
k=3 "keb(r1(P 
k )), we could apply Lemma 16 to P and P0 in the analysis of the following 4 cases.
32Case 1: (i) 'r1(P1)(P)  "1 and 'r1(P2)(P)  "2, and (ii) 'r1(P0
1)(P0) < "1.
Now, h(P0
1;P2) follows from equation (1). Then, given u 2 U(P1), the loss from mis-
representation in h is U1(P1;P2) U1(P0
1;P2) = 1
"1+"2
h
"1u(r1(P1)) 'r1(P0
1)(P0)u(r1(P0
1)) 
P
x2  B(P0) 'x(P0)u(x)
i
 0. This completes the verication of Case 1.
Case 2: (i) 'r1(P1)(P)  "1 and 'r1(P2)(P)  "2, and (ii) 'r1(P2)(P0) < "2.
We rst claim that this case only occurs when N = 3. Suppose not, i.e., N  4.
Since 'r1(P1)(P)  "1 and 'r1(P2)(P)  "2, by Lemma 16 (ii), we assume without loss
of generality that voter i, where i 2 f3;:::;Ng, is the special voter of P. Next, since
N  4, there must exist another voter, i.e., voter j such that j = 2 f1;2;ig. Furthermore,
applying Lemma 16 (iii) to P, we know that r1(Pi)Pj r1(P2). In the other hand,
'r1(P2)(P0) < "2 indicates that voter 2 is the special voter of P0. Therefore, applying
Lemma 16 (iii) to P0, we have that r1(P2)Pj r1(Pi). Contradiction!
Now, by Lemma 16 (i), to simplify the notation, we can assume that r1(P1) = a,
r1(P2) = c, r1(P
3) = f and r1(P0
1) = d, where a;c;f are mutually distinct and d;c;f
are mutually distinct. (it is possible that a = d) Furthermore, h(P0
1;P2) follows from
equation (2). Therefore, given u 2 U(P1), the loss from misrepresentation in h is
U1(P1;P2) U1(P0
1;P2) =
1
"1 + "2
h
"1u(a)+"2u(c) "1u(d) 'c(P0)u(c) 
X
x2  B(P0)
'x(P0)u(x)
i
where "2 = 'c(P0) +
P
x2  B(P0) 'x(P0).
To show that U1(P1;P2) U1(P0
1;P2)  0, We will consider the following 2 situations:
dP1c and cP1d.
Firstly, we claim that if dP1c then U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2)  0. Since either a =
d or aP1d, to verify the claim, we only need to show that cP1x for all x 2  B(P0)
with 'x(P0) > 0. Suppose not, i.e., there exists x 2  B(P0) such that 'x(P0) > 0
and xP1c. In prole P, since 'a(P)  "1, 'c(P)  "2 and N = 3, by Lemma 16
(ii) and (iii), we know that voter 3 is the special voter of P and fP1c. Let x0 =
min(P1;fx;d;fg). Hence x0P1c. Assume x0 = rs(P1). As we showed in the proof
of Lemma 15,
Ps
k=1 'rk(P1)(P) = "1 + "3. Meanwhile, Lemma 16 (ii) implies that
'd(P0) = "1 and 'f(P0) = "3. Then, 'x(P0) > 0 implies that
Ps
k=1 'rk(P1)(P) <
"1 + "3 + 'x(P0) = 'd(P0) + 'f(P0) + 'x(P0) 
Ps
k=1 'rk(P1)(P0). Therefore, voter
1 manipulates at P via P0
1 in ' - a contradiction.
Next, we claim that that if cP1d then U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2)  0. Now, it is
evident that a 6= d. Since c = 2  B(P0), we separate  B(P0) into two parts S and T
as follows: for all x 2 S, xP1c and for all z 2 T, cP1z. If S = ;, then for all
x 2  B(P0), cP1x. Therefore, it is true that U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2) = "1
"1+"2
h
u(a)  
u(d)
i
+ 1
"1+"2
P
x2  B(P0) 'x(P0)
h
u(c)   u(x)
i
 0.
Next, consider S 6= ;. Let x = max(P1;S). Then it is true that (i) either aP1x
or a = x, (ii) xP1c, (iii) cP1d and (iv) cP1z for all z 2 T (if T 6= ;). Furthermore,
33U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2) could be modied as follows:
U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2)
=
1
"1 + "2
h
"1u(a) + "2u(c)   "1u(d)   'c(P0)u(c)  
X
x2S
'x(P0)u(x)  
X
z2T
'z(P0)u(z)
i

1
"1 + "2
h
"1u(a) + "2u(c)   "1u(d)   'c(P0)u(c)   u(x)
X
x2S
'x(P0)  
X
z2T
'z(P0)u(z)
i
=
"1
"1 + "2
h
u(a)   u(x)
i
+
"1  
P
x2S
'x(P0)
"1 + "2
h
u(x)   u(c)
i
+
"1
"1 + "2
h
u(c)   u(d)
i
+
1
"1 + "2
X
z2T
'z(P0)
h
u(c)   u(z)
i
Therefore, according to the relative rankings in P1 specied above, to show that
U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2)  0, it suces to show "1 
P
x2S 'x(P0).
Assume min(P1;S) = y and let z = min(P1;ff;yg). Assume z = rs(P1).
Hence, frk(P1)gs
k=1 = B(P1;z) [ fzg. In prole P, since 'a(P)  "1, 'c(P)  "2
and N = 3, by Lemma 16 (ii) and (iii), we know that voter 3 is the special voter
of P and fP1c. Hence, zP1c. Therefore, as we showed in the proof of Lemma 15,
we have that
Ps
k=1 'rk(P1)(P) = "1 + "3. Next, in prole P0, by Lemma 16 (ii) and
(iv), we know that for all z = 2 fd;c;fg [  B(P0), 'z(P0) = 0. Furthermore, since
[B(P1;z) [ fzg] \ fd;c;fg = ffg and [B(P1;z) [ fzg] \  B(P0) = S, we have
that
Ps
k=1 'rk(P1)(P0) 
P
x2B(P1;z)[fzg 'x(P0) = 'f(P0) +
P
x2S 'x(P0) = "3 +
P
x2S 'x(P0) (Lemma 16 (ii) implies that 'f(P0) = "3). Then, the strategy-proofness
of ' implies that "1 
P
x2S 'x(P0). This completes the verication of Case 2.
Case 3: (i) 'r1(P1)(P) < "1, and (ii) 'r1(P0
1)(P0)  "1 and 'r1(P2)(P0)  "2.
Now, h(P1;P2) follows from equation (1). Then, given u 2 U(P1), the loss from
misrepresentation in h is
U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2) =
1
"1 + "2
h
'r1(P1)(P)u(r1(P1)) +
X
x2  B(P)
'x(P)u(x)   "1u(r1(P0
1))
i
where 'r1(P1)(P) +
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P) = "1.
Firstly, since 'r1(P1)(P) < "1 and 'r1(P0
1)(P0)  "1, strategy-proofness implies
that r1(P1) 6= r1(P0
1). Next, it is evident that r1(P1)P1 r1(P0
1). Therefore, to show
U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2)  0, it suces to show that for all x 2  B(P) with 'x(P) > 0
and x 6= r1(P0
1), xP1r1(P0
1).
Now, suppose there exists z0 2  B(P) such that 'z0(P) > 0 and r1(P0
1)P1z0. Firstly,
 B(P)   B1(P) implies that z0 2  B1(P). Let s1 and s2 be such that r1(P0
1) = rs1(P1)
and z0 = rs2(P1). Hence, 1 < s1 < s2. As we showed in the proof of Lemma 16
(iv), 'r1(P1)(P) +
P
x2  B1(P) 'x(P) = "1. Then, 'z0(P) > 0 and z0 2  B1(P) imply
that
Ps1
k=1 'rk(P1)(P) <
Ps2
k=1 'rk(P1)(P)  "1 = 'r1(P0
1)(P0) 
Ps1
k=1 'rk(P1)(P0).
34Therefore, voter 1 manipulates at P via P0
1 in ' - a contradiction. This complete the
verication of Case 3.
Case 4: (i) 'r1(P2)(P) < "2, and (ii) 'r1(P0
1)(P0)  "1 and 'r1(P2)(P0)  "2.
As in Case 2, we can claim that this case only occur when N = 3. Now, h(P1;P2)
follows from equation (2). Since 'r1(P2)(P) < "2, we know that voter 2 is the special
voter of P by Lemma 16 (ii). Hence, for all x 2  B(P), xP1r1(P2) by Lemma 16 (iii).
Then, given u 2 U(P1), the loss from manipulation in h is U1(P1;P2)   U1(P0
1;P2) =
"1
"1+"2
h
u(r1(P1)) u(r1(P0
1))
i
+ 1
"1+"2
P
x2  B(P) 'x(P)
h
u(x) u(r1(P2))
i
 0. This com-
pletes the verication of Case 4.
Finally, using symmetric arguments for voter 2, we conclude that h is strategy-proof.
This completes the verication of Claim 4 and the proof of Lemma 18.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 6 and Theorem 3.
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